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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ARTICLE

EXPLOITATION OF THE ELITE: A CASE FOR
PHYSICIAN UNIONIZATION

DIONNE KOLLER FINE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical service with
compassion and respect for human dignity.1
This first principle of medical ethics sounds deceptively simple. The
complexities are apparent, however, when this and other principles of medical
ethics work in a system of managed health care. Under managed care, the
issue is usually the cost of “compassionate” and “competent” medical care and
not the care itself. This presents a difficult dilemma for physicians.2 As one
commentator has stated:
[P]oliticians attempting to reform the health care system have promised that
they will meet the contradictory goals of containing health care costs and
increasing the number of people with adequate health care coverage.

* Assistant Dean for Student Affairs and Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington
University Law School. Special thanks to Steven Schooner and Andrew Altman for their helpful
comments and support. Thanks also to my research assistants, Jennifer Kantor and Rachel Zakar.
1. American Medical Association Policy Finder, E-Principles of Medical Ethics (Sept. 19,
2000), available at http://www.ama-assn.org.
2. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000). “[I]n an HMO system, a physician’s
financial interest lies in providing less care, not more. The check on this influence (like that on
the converse, fee-for-service incentive) is the professional obligation to provide covered services
with a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the patient’s interest.” Id. at 2149 (citation
omitted).
207

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

208

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:207

Meanwhile, pre-paid health plans proliferate, advertising low costs and
seemingly unrestricted benefits to prospective patients. Neither group wants to
acknowledge the need to ration care. Thus, the easiest solution may be for
politicians and third-party payers to avoid explicit acknowledgment of the need
to ration, while creating policies that implicitly require physicians to ration at
the bedside.3

This pressure from the government and managed care organizations
(“MCOs”) to “ration at the bedside” and consider cost as a component of care
has serious implications for patients. Not surprisingly, the effects of costconscious utilization review led to a “managed care backlash,”4 prompting
policy makers to propose numerous “patients’ rights” reforms seemingly
designed to guarantee that patients can still have their health care like the old
fee-for-service days, but maintain the cost-cutting that managed care seeks to
deliver.5 One of these proposals, the Quality Health Care Coalition Act (“the
Health Care Act”),6 emerged recently as a potential solution to the perceived
problem of MCOs putting cost before patient care.7 The Health Care Act
would give physicians greater negotiating power against MCOs by allowing
them to bargain collectively.8 Many physicians as well as the American
Medical Association (“AMA”) support the proposal.9
One would expect physicians to support the Health Care Act based on
managed care’s profound effects on their practices. Long considered wealthy
elites, physicians have not captured the sympathy of politicians or the
American public in the managed care debate. Yet managed care’s effects on
them are no less significant than the effects of managed care on patients.
Indeed, the lower reimbursements, which are a key part of managed care, have
caused some physicians’ practices to go bankrupt and have even driven some

3. Peter A. Ubel, M.D. & Robert M. Arnold, M.D., The Unbearable Rightness of Bedside
Rationing: Physician Duties in a Climate of Cost Containment, in THREE REALMS OF MANAGED
CARE, SOCIETAL, INSTITUTIONAL, INDIVIDUAL 170 (John W. Glaser & Ronald P. Hamel eds.,
1997).
4. See David A. Hyman, Managed Care at the Millennium: Scenes from a Maul, 24 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1061, 1061-62 (1999) [hereinafter Hyman, Managed Care at the
Millennium].
5. Id.
6. H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (1999). The measure was passed recently by the House and
awaits action in the Senate.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. See Statement of the American Medical Association to Congress, Testimony in Support
of H.R. 1304, the Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1999, 106th Cong. 1 (June 22, 1999)
(statement of E. Radcliffe Anderson, Jr., M.D., Executive Vice President and Chief Executive
Officer of the AMA) [hereinafter AMA Statement], at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/basic/article/
0%2C1059%2C177-461-1%2C00.html.
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physicians to leave the practice of medicine.10 Further, many of our best and
brightest may no longer be selecting a career in medicine.11 Yet physicians
largely do not support the unionization proposal on this basis. At the center of
physicians’ argument for collective bargaining rights is that such a step is
necessary to ensure quality patient care.12
Opponents of unionization argue that allowing physicians to bargain
collectively will not improve patient care, but will simply raise physicians’
salaries and further compound the health care crisis.13 The likelihood that
either of these competing claims is true will not be examined here. Instead,
this essay examines the physician unionization debate from the perspective of
physicians as opposed to patients. Unlike a traditional worker seeking
unionization, physicians, at least openly, do not argue that unionization is
warranted because MCOs are exploiting them. This essay, however, assumes
that they do for purposes of exploring whether such a claim might be
warranted. The vehicle for this exercise is a hypothetical “moral motion to
dismiss.”14 That is, taking physicians’ arguments against managed care to be
true, do they state a moral claim for collective bargaining rights? I assert that
they do.
First, managed care has had a profound, negative effect on physicians’
salaries and working conditions. Second, physicians are hesitant and in some
cases unable to advocate on their own behalf. Third, the “free market” for
health care, which government and MCOs purport to promote, is not so free at
all. Taken together, these points illustrate that MCOs, in some cases, may have
an unfair advantage over physicians, which MCOs are able to use to their
significant benefit. Accordingly, physicians legitimately can make the claim
that MCOs, with the support of corporations and the federal government, are to
some degree exploiting them. Thus, physicians’ argument for an antitrust
exemption to allow them to bargain collectively has some moral basis, and
should not be brushed aside as simply an attempt by wealthy elites to protect
their position. While it may be that some exploitation of physicians is
necessary and can be justified as being for the “greater good” of solving our
health care crisis, in the long run, society will only benefit from seriously
considering the impact health reform has on physicians.

10. Anne Barnard & Kathryn Tong, The Doctor is Out: More and More Physicians,
Frustrated with Managed Care, Are Trying New Professions and Finding Life Less Stressful,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 2000, at A1.
11. See Daniel S. Greenberg, USA’s Changing Environment of Medical School Enrollments,
352 LANCET 1531, 1531 (1998).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 76-81.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 82-94.
14. See WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1357 (1990) (“[F]or
purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to
plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true.”).
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

What is Managed Care?

Before explaining managed care’s effects on physicians, it is important to
explain the managed care system. The managed care system gained popularity
as a way to curb steadily rising healthcare costs.15 Thus, it is “a collective
response on the part of both public and private payers to mounting evidence of
out-of-control health care costs which threatened the future of health
insurance . . . .”16 Employers concerned about the costs of employee health
benefits are key supporters of managed care, as they believe it will help reduce
health care costs and make providers more accountable.17 The government is
also an important player in the success of managed care, through legislation18
and in its role as a purchaser of health care services through the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. Thus, it has been stated that “[c]ost reduction, not quality
improvement, was the predominant motivation for the switch to managed
care.”19 This focus on cost is significant not simply for employers looking to
reduce health benefit expenditures, but for physicians as well. Before managed
care, it was the physician who was “the locus and determinant of quality.”20
Traditionally, cost was not a concern in the treatment decision.21
The managed care system emphasizes the cost of health care services and
attempts to control these costs through a variety of different techniques. In
general, managed care is:
[A]ny health coverage arrangement in which, for a pre-set fee (i.e., the
premium), a company sells a defined package of benefits to a purchaser, with
services furnished to enrolled members through a network of participating
providers who operate under written contractual or employment agreements,
and whose selection and authority to furnish covered benefits is controlled by
the managed care company.22

15. DENNIS A. ROBBINS, INTEGRATING MANAGED CARE AND ETHICS: TRANSFORMING
CHALLENGES INTO POSITIVE OUTCOMES 5 (1998).
16. RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 546
(1997).
17. ROBBINS, supra note 15, at 5.
18. See, e.g., Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat.
914 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
19. ROBBINS, supra note 15, at 3.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. ROSENBLATT, supra note 16, at 551-52; see also KENNETH R. WING ET AL., THE LAW
AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 84 (1998) (The term managed care “can be used to include
virtually any financing arrangement where there is third-party management or supervision that
attempts in some structured way to oversee quality and, particularly, the costs of services
delivered to the plan’s beneficiaries.”).
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The “control” exercised by MCOs is in the form of “supply- and demand-side
strategies to force patients and providers to consider the marginal costs in
making health care consumption decisions.”23 Courts have noted that in this
role, MCOs can wear two hats: providing administrative support for an
insurance plan, including making determinations of eligibility or coverage, and
acting “as an arranger and provider of medical treatment.”24 For instance,
MCOs often require pre-authorization for certain services, restrict access to
specialists, deny payment for services provided outside the “network,” require
co-payments, pay physicians on a capitated basis or offer bonuses tied to
certain utilization levels and restrict coverage of prescription drugs, among
other things.25 In short, MCOs enforce utilization management by controlling
physicians’ behavior.26 It is these types of controls that have led to the
“managed care backlash” and concern over its effects on patients.27 As
mentioned above, however, the tools of managed care also have a significant
impact on physicians.
B.

Managed Care’s Effects on Physicians

In evaluating the “claim” physicians might make against MCOs and
whether it would survive a “moral motion to dismiss,” we must first determine
the basis of the claim. A moral claim by physicians is derived from managed
care’s effects on their professional obligations, working conditions and
incomes. In general, physicians feel a loss of control over their practices.28
Many physicians feel that the utilization management undertaken by MCOs is
“oppressive” and unduly interferes with the physician-patient relationship by,
for instance, limiting the diagnostic tests and prescription drugs they may order
and limiting referrals to specialists and the emergency room.29 As one
commentator explained:
This trend toward corporate control is eroding the foundation of the physicianpatient relationship. This erosion is primarily caused by managed health care
plans exercising a significant amount of economic leverage over physicians.
This leverage enables health plan providers to assume substantial control over

23. David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of
Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 229 (2000) [hereinafter Hyman, Regulating Managed Care].
24. Corp. Health Ins. v. Texas Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 2000).
25. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 23, at 229.
26. John J. Deis, The Unionization of Independent Contracting Physicians: A Comedy of
Errors, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 951, 954 (1999).
27. Id.
28. Chris Phan, Physician Unionization: The Impact On the Medical Profession, 20 J.
LEGAL MED. 115, 116 (1999).
29. Ellen L. Luepke, White Coat, Blue Collar: Physician Unionization and Managed Care, 8
ANNALS HEALTH L. 275, 277 (1999); Phan, supra note 28, at 117. As stated above, it is the
effects of utilization review on patients which dominates policy debates over managed care.
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patient medical decision-making, drive down physician incomes, and threaten
the viability of some physicians’ practices.30

In their article Managed Care and the Physician’s Marketplace, Carol J.
Simon, William D. White, Patricia Born and David Dranvoe recently noted
that “[u]nder managed care the locus of decision making about where care is
received and what care is obtained is shifted from individual patients and their
physicians towards insurers and employers.”31 Moreover, beyond simple
frustration with MCO oversight, many physicians have ethical objections to the
financial incentives used by MCOs to encourage physicians to limit care.32
The challenge to physicians’ autonomy in clinical decision making in
many respects is more difficult for physicians than decreased salary.
Historically, physicians have enjoyed what Magali Sarfatti Larson calls a
“monopoly of competence” supported by state licensing requirements and a
“monopoly of credibility with the public.”33 According to Larson, this
monopoly of competence is important because “it restricts the control by
outside agencies over the actual ethicality of the transaction of professional
services.”34 In the view of physicians, however, managed care has invaded this
previously restricted zone. As one recent study noted, more than one-third of
surveyed physicians characterized their morale as low and nearly one-half
stated that they often think about leaving medicine.35 Some physicians feel
that they are under siege.36
The economic effects of managed care on physicians are also significant.
While in 1986, only forty-three percent of physicians participated with a
managed care plan, by 1995, that figure had risen to eighty-three percent. This
participation often puts physicians at financial risk.37 In 1994, physician
income dropped 3.8%.38 This trend continues.39 Indeed, in a recent article,

30. Phan, supra note 28, at 117 (footnote omitted).
31. Carol J. Simon et al., Managed Care and the Physician Marketplace, in MANAGED
CARE AND CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETS 96 (Michael A. Morrisey ed., 1998).
32. See Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M., M.D., Ph.D., et al., Physicians’ Ethical Beliefs About
Cost-Control Arrangements,160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 649 (2000).
33. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 38 (1977).
34. Id.
35. Most Doctors Oppose Managed-Care Hassles, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Sept. 21, 1998,
at 38.
36. Joseph Bernstein, M.D., M.S., Topics in Medical Economics: Lessons of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, 82-A J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 595, 595 (2000).
37. Fred J. Hellinger, The Impact of Financial Incentives on Physician Behavior in Managed
Care Plans: A Review of the Evidence, 53 MED. CARE RES. REV. 294, 295 (1996).
38. WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 73 (1998).
39. See Vitals, MODERN PHYSICIAN (June 1, 1999), at http://www.modernphysician.com/
archive/article.php3?refid=1000 (“Median net income for doctors dropped for the fourth
consecutive year in 1997, according to the American Medical Association.”); see also Anita J.
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Daniel R. Roach states that “providers are fighting for their lives.”40
Physicians who are now forced to participate with MCOs face “deselection”
(termination from the plan) if they do not contain health care costs in line with
MCOs market-driven strategy.41 This termination is made even swifter
because MCOs commonly include termination-without-cause provisions in
their contracts. 42 Some plans even include indemnification provisions as part
of their contracts, which shift liability and hold the plan harmless for its acts.43
In describing providers’ inability to comply with burdensome federal Medicare
regulations, Roach cites their lack of resources. He states:
Physicians are . . . extraordinarily frustrated with the current state of affairs as
their incomes are plummet[ing] and their job satisfaction declines. In
California, 115 physician groups have either declared bankruptcy or gone out
of business in the last three years. An estimated eighty-five percent are in
serious financial trouble.44

The effects of managed care on physicians are trickling down to impact
medical students, and even students considering careers in medicine.45
Physicians’ reactions to managed care largely have been dismissed as the
inevitable anger over loss of professional dominance, income and prestige.
One commentator recently remarked that “[i]t has been said that a good drama
requires victims, villains, and heroes. If so, the managed care backlash has
been a most excellent drama, with . . . providers playing the victims . . . .”46
Such a view, however, fails to consider the level of commitment most
physicians have to serving their patients, the training involved in becoming a
physician and the extraordinary responsibilities a practicing physician
undertakes.47 As stated by Larson: “[I]n a secularized society, medicine serves
most directly the ‘sacred’ value of life.”48 She further notes that “of all the

Slomski, How Much are Groups Paying Their Doctors?, MED. ECON., Jan. 10, 2000, at 115, 119
(“Specialists will see their salaries decrease as they reach their workweek limit.”).
40. Daniel R. Roach & Cori MacDonneil, The Compliance Conundrum, 32 J. HEALTH &
HOSP. L. 565, 568 (1999).
41. Richard S. Liner, Physician Deselection: The Dynamics of a New Threat to the
Physician-Patient Relationship, 23 AM. J. L. & MED. 511, 512-13 (1997).
42. Id.
43. See Corp. Health Ins. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000). Several states
have passed legislation to protect physicians from retaliatory deselection and the indemnification
provisions commonly found in MCO-physician contracts. A Texas statute recently was upheld
against an MCO challenge that it was preempted by ERISA. Id. at 536-37.
44. Roach, supra note 40, at 568.
45. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 1531.
46. Hyman, Managed Care at the Millenium, supra note 4, at 1068.
47. See Phan, supra note 28, at 116 (“Physicians, on the whole, have the longest educational
and specialty training path of any professional.”).
48. LARSON, supra note 33, at 38-39.
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professions, it appears to have the strongest claims to an ideal of service and
devotion to human welfare.”49
C. The Current Legal Climate—Antitrust and Labor Laws
Most physicians are unable to take collective action to counteract the
effects of managed care. Physician unionization is prohibited by the antitrust
laws, which apply to collective action by sellers or purchasers of goods and
services to restrain trade through such means as, for instance, price fixing.50
Specifically, the Sherman Act “seeks to safeguard competition by assuring that
market participants do not injure consumers by making agreements that
illegally restrain trade.”51 The Clayton Act, on the other hand, provides an
exemption to the antitrust laws by allowing labor unions to collectively bargain
on behalf of their members.52 The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)
builds on the Clayton Act by further defining the labor exemption from the
antitrust laws and establishing the National Labor Relations Board.53
Physicians who are employed by the federal government, hospitals or
health maintenance organizations, for example, are covered by the Clayton Act
and therefore, in general, are permitted to bargain collectively.54 Employed
physicians have had difficulty organizing, however, in that they are frequently
considered to be independent contractors or supervisory employees and are,
thus, exempt from the NLRA.55 Approximately fifteen percent of all patient
care physicians are employed and eligible to join unions.56 It is the remaining
majority of physicians, those in private practice, to whom federal physician
unionization legislation would apply.
III. THE UNIONIZATION PROPOSAL
A.

The Quality Health Care Coalition Act

Originally introduced by Representative Tom Campbell (R-Ca.), along
with over one hundred co-sponsors, the Health Care Act’s stated purpose is to
ensure and foster continued patient safety and quality of care by making the
antitrust laws apply to negotiations between groups of health care professionals
and health plans and health insurance issuers in the same manner as such laws

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Physicians, Unions, and Antitrust, 32 J. HEALTH L. 43 (1999).
Luepke, supra note 29, at 282.
Id.
Id.
Hirshfeld, supra note 50, at 51.
Luepke, supra note 29, at 282-83.
Julie Rovner, USA Takes First Steps to a Doctors’ Union, 354 LANCET 54 (1999).
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apply to collective bargaining by labor organizations under the National Labor
Relations Act.57

Thus, the bill’s main provision states:
Any health care professionals who are engaged in negotiations with a health
plan regarding the terms of any contract under which the professionals provide
health care items or services . . . shall, in connection with such negotiations, be
entitled to the same treatment under the antitrust laws as the treatment to which
bargaining units recognized under the National Labor Relations Act are
entitled in connection to such collective bargaining. Such a professional shall,
only in connection with such negotiations, be treated as an employee engaged
in concerted activities and shall not be regarded as having the status of an
employer, independent contractor, managerial employee, or supervisor.58

Significantly, the proposed legislation does not provide physicians with the
right to go on strike and stop treating patients. Moreover, the statute would not
apply to negotiations pertaining to federal programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid. The proposed legislation also includes a three-year sunset
provision.
Shortly after it was introduced, the AMA voted to endorse unionization to
“give America’s physicians the leverage they now lack to guarantee that
patient care is not compromised or neglected for the sake of profits.”59 Since
that time, there has been considerable movement on the state level, with
seventeen states considering collective negotiation bills.60 Only the District of
Columbia bill has passed, however, and that measure currently awaits
Congressional approval.61 Texas is the only state with a collective bargaining
statute in effect.62 The Texas statute is instructive. In its “Findings and
Purposes,” the legislature stated:
Although the legislature finds that joint negotiations over fee-related terms
may in some circumstances yield anti-competitive effects, it also recognizes
that there are instances in which health plans dominate the market to such a
degree that fair negotiations between physicians and the plan are unobtainable
absent any joint action on behalf of physicians. In these instances, health plans
have the ability to virtually dictate the terms of the contracts they offer
physicians.63

The statute authorizes physicians to jointly negotiate with health plans in all
instances with respect to certain terms, such as “practices and procedures” for
57. The Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1999, H.R. 13041, 106th Cong. (1999).
58. Id.
59. Rovner, supra note 56, at 54 (quoting AMA Board Chairman Randolph Smoak, M.D.).
60. Leigh Page, State Legislatures Cool to Collective Negotiation Bills, AM. MED. NEWS
(June 26, 2000), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/gvsa0626.html.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 29.01 (Vernon 2000) (emphasis added).
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improving the delivery of health care.64 Unlike the proposed federal
legislation, the Texas statute provides that collective negotiation is not
permitted with respect to fees, unless the attorney general makes a
determination that the health plan has “substantial market power.”65 The
statute is effective until September 1, 2003.66
B.

The Unionization Debate

In evaluating physicians’ hypothetical claim,67 it also is helpful to examine
the unionization debate itself. The arguments that are made, and those that are
not made, for and against the unionization proposal, shed important light on
physicians’ role in our drive to reform health care. An analysis of the debate
provides support for a claim that physicians are to some degree being
exploited.
1.

Arguments for the Legislation

One might expect physicians to support the Health Care Act on the basis
that managed care has had a dramatic effect on their salaries, working
conditions and the very essence of their “physicianhood.” Yet arguments for
legislation center not on this point, but on harm to patients. Advocates argue
that the “tremendous control” MCOs exert over physicians has “adverse
effects” on patient care.68 During hearings on the Health Care Act, William
W. Tipton, Jr., M.D., speaking on behalf of the American Association of
Orthopedic Surgeons, stated that the problem, in many ways, lies in the everincreasing consolidation of the health insurance industry.69 Dr. Tipton stated:
[T]hrough consolidation, health plans not only gain market power, but
economic strength as well. As a result, they have been able to join together,
not to negotiate or discuss contracts with physicians, but to dictate the terms of
their contracts on a “take it or leave it” basis. They have been able to impose

64. Id. art. 29.04.
65. Id. art. 29.06(a).
66. Id. art. 29.01.
67. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze whether physician unionization is
generally “good policy.” Whereas physician unionization might not be good policy for ensuring
quality patient care, as opponents to the legislation argue, it might be very effective in restoring
physicians’ autonomy over treatment decisions and guaranteeing what physicians regard as a fair
level of compensation. This paper does not resolve these issues.
68. Statement of the American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons on the Quality Health
Care Coalition Act of 1999 before the House Judiciary Comm.: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) (statement of William W. Tipton, Jr., M.D.,
Executive Vice-President of the American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons) [hereinafter
Tipton Statement].
69. Id.
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contract terms, which often are not in the best interest of patients, in order to
maximize their profits and minimize their patient care responsibilities.70

Dr. Tipton went on to explain that many of these “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts
restrict the ability of patients to receive necessary care by giving the plans veto
power over physicians’ medical decisions,71 restricting referrals to specialists
and imposing burdensome administrative requirements that act to delay care.72
Dr. Tipton also noted that many health plan contracts contain “hold harmless”
clauses, which give plans malpractice immunity and shift liability completely
to the physician even though the plan may have dictated the treatment
decision.73 Dr. Tipton concluded by arguing that passage of the Health Care
Act would give physicians the power to have input into “how health care is
delivered in this new era of managed care.”74 This power, he argues, “will
help restore the role of physicians as the patient’s best advocate.”75
The AMA, in its statement on the Health Care Act, also stressed that the
legislation was needed to ensure quality patient care.76 The AMA went into
great detail about the consolidation of the health care industry and how this
type of market concentration is harmful to patients. The AMA stated that the
Aetna/U.S. Healthcare plan had “dangerous levels of control” in several
states.77 The AMA stated that since 1996, Aetna has acquired not only U.S.
Healthcare, but also NYL Care and has announced its intention to purchase
Prudential, resulting in Aetna having 22.4 million covered lives.78 The AMA
argued that “Aetna’s extremely aggressive and anti-patient business
practices . . . actually work to significantly increase its market power. Aetna’s
growth and profitability is not about popularity and success as a result of high
quality health care, it’s about aggressively purchasing market share.”79 The
AMA also noted that the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice had not taken actions against health care plans, despite the “tremendous
consolidation” that has taken place.80 The AMA asserted that this was in stark
contrast to the aggressive action taken against physicians in the form of

70. Id.
71. See AMA Statement, supra note 9, at 7 (“[T]ypical examples of egregious contract terms
are as follows: . . . ‘Medical necessity means the SHORTEST, LEAST EXPENSIVE, OR LEAST
INTENSE LEVEL of treatment, care or service rendered, or supply provided, as determined by us
[health plan]’” (alteration in original).
72. Tipton Statement, supra note 68.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See AMA Statement, supra note 9, at 3-4.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 6.
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antitrust investigations, evidencing what the AMA calls “a bias against
physicians and in favor of payers.”81
2.

Arguments Against the Legislation

Opponents of the Health Care Act are extremely skeptical of physicians’
arguments on behalf of patients and their promises to improve patient care.
The American Association of Health Plans (“AAHP”), in its testimony before
the House Judiciary Committee, stated that “[the Health Care Act] will benefit
physicians, not consumers.”82 Indeed, opponents’ arguments focus on
competition and the free market, and state that giving physicians
“unprecedented collective bargaining rights” will only injure consumers, not
protect patients.83
Opponents repeatedly stressed the importance of the free market. The
AAHP stated that “vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws is crucial to preserve
and ensure competition in the health care marketplace.”84 The AAHP
challenged physicians’ assertions that health plans have dominant power,
stating that there is “significant” competition among health plans.85 The
AAHP stressed that it is aware of physicians who are guilty of anti-competitive
behavior, stating that “a great deal of . . . anti-competitive conduct still occurs
today and the antitrust enforcement agencies have devoted substantial
resources to protecting consumers from it.”86 The AAHP asserted that
“physicians do not need antitrust exemptions to address quality of care issues,”
as health plans had “a variety of mechanisms in place that allow—and in fact
encourage—physicians to contribute to efforts to improve quality of care.”87
The government, through the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, echoed these “free market” arguments.88 Joel Klein, Assistant
Attorney General and Head of the Antitrust Division, stated in testimony
before Congress:
As in other markets, the goal for health care markets should be to ensure that
consumers benefit from a competitive marketplace where neither buyers nor
sellers unlawfully exercise market power. Policy should focus on ensuring that
there is a competitive marketplace where neither health insurance plans nor

81. See AMA Statement, supra note 9, at 7.
82. The Quality Health Care Act of 1998, Hearings on H.R. 4277 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 73-79 (1998) (statement of Steven J.
Demontmollin, Vice President and General Counsel, Av-Med Health Plan, on behalf of the
AAHP) [hereinafter AAHP Statement].
83. Id.
84. Id. at 78.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. AAHP Statement, supra note 82, at 78.
88. Id. at 73-79.
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health care professionals are able to obtain or exercise market power to distort
the competitive outcome . . . permitting providers to form bargaining groups in
response to perceived bargaining leverage by insurers will not decrease the
cost of health care or increase the quality of patient care.89

Klein stressed that the Health Care Act would thus only serve to increase costs
to consumers and the government. He stated that “providers have their own
self interests, and our enforcement actions and other experience suggest that
their actions may not be congruent with the interests of consumers.”90 He
concluded by stating:
The better approach is to empower consumers by encouraging price
competition . . . and ensuring effective antitrust enforcement both with regard
to buyers (health insurance plans) and sellers (health care professionals) of
provider services. Competitive issues are best dealt with in a manner which
promotes competition, not retards competition, as this bill would do if
enacted.91

Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, supported
these arguments and stated that “this extension of the labor exemption is being
offered as a way to remedy matters that collective bargaining was never
intended to address . . . collective bargaining rights are designed to raise the
incomes and improve working conditions of union members.”92 He went on to
state that patient care issues are important, but an “ill-fitting” labor exemption
is not the right approach.93 He asserted that if physicians had collective
bargaining rights, “we can expect prices for health care services to rise
substantially.” 94
The arguments for and against the Health Care Act shed considerable light
on physicians’ position in the current health care crisis. Because the physician
culture does not encourage advocacy on their own behalf, and because
physicians likely understand that such advocacy would not be well received,
they center their argument for collective bargaining rights on concern for
patients. This sets physicians up for the easy attack that the legislation is really
about protecting physicians. Indeed, the AAHP’s arguments, furthered by the
government, that the Health Care Act would lead to increased physician fees is
probably correct. Opponents stress that physicians’ incomes are simply high

89. The Quality Health Care Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1304 Before the House
Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. 1 (June 22, 1999) (statement of Joel I. Klein).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The Quality Health Care Act of 1998, Hearings on H.R. 4277 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 73-79 (1998) (statement of Hon. Robert
Pitofsky, Chairman, on behalf of the F.T.C.) [hereinafter F.T.C. Statement].
93. Id.
94. Id.
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enough. They do not, however, explain why.95 This notion that physicians are
fairly compensated and should not advocate on their own behalf provides a
background for physician exploitation.
The health care debate also highlights the fact that in many ways,
physicians are caught in a game where the rules have changed dramatically.
Physicians are not trained to view health care as simply another “good” or
“service.” For the physician, a career in medicine is a calling, not a job. The
delivery of health care involves moral and ethical complexities that do not
surround the delivery of typical consumer goods and services. Yet the
opponents to collective bargaining do not speak in these terms. Instead, they
speak in the more comfortable terms of the market: we are dealing with
“consumers,” not “patients,” and “providers,” or “sellers,” instead of
“physicians.”96 The opponents have in many ways used this “market
metaphor”97 to cast physicians as anti-competitive actors in what is supposed
to be a free market for health care. In our capitalist society, “free market”
arguments are powerful. This rhetoric provides the background for physician
exploitation.
IV. CAN PHYSICIANS STATE A MORAL CLAIM FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
RIGHTS?
A.

Elements of Exploitation

In considering whether physicians can state a moral claim to collective
bargaining rights, it is important to explain the moral theory under which they
might proceed. In this case, theories of exploitation are instructive since such
theories traditionally are at the root of drives to unionize.98 Moreover,
“exploitation, or one of its legal analogues, increasingly forms a basis for
social and legal policy determinations with respect to a wide range of issues.”99
Exploitation can form the basis for a moral claim not simply to invalidate a

95. Opponents instead argue that physicians’ income and their “anti-competitive behavior”
are in large part responsible for the current health care crisis, although studies show that this is
not the case. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?, 6 J. OF
ECON. PERSP. 3, 8 (1992) (“Those who emphasize supplier-induced demand as a factor in the
expenditure increase argue that as physician supply has grown, physicians have increased demand
to protect their incomes . . . . The evidence, however, does not offer much support to the view that
supplier-induced demand is important in the rate of change.”).
96. See George J. Annas, J.D., M.H.P., Reframing the Debate on Health Care Reform by
Replacing our Metaphors, reprinted in THREE REALMS OF MANAGED CARE, SOCIETAL,
INSTITUTIONAL, INDIVIDUAL 68-69 (John W. Glaser & Ronald P. Hamel eds.,1997).
97. See id. at 67-69.
98. See JACK BARBASH, THE PRACTICE OF UNIONISM 407 (1956).
99. John Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 635 (1994) (footnote
omitted).
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particular transaction, but, as Alan Wertheimer argues, to call attention “to the
injustice or wrongness of the conditions under which it is rational for B to
accept A’s proposal, and with arguing for the repair of those conditions.”100
This is the case here, where physicians are not seeking legislation to invalidate
their transactions with MCOs, but instead seek unionization to repair or
restructure the “background conditions” under which the two sides deal.
Wertheimer defines exploitation as a transaction where one party, A, takes
unfair advantage of another party, B.101 This unfair advantage must result in a
gain for A.102 Wertheimer further explains that a transaction is “unfair” where
A’s benefit is excessive, relative to the benefit to B, or A “has been able to turn
some characteristic of B or some feature of B’s situation to his or her
advantage.”103 Wertheimer asserts that exploitation can take place even in
“mutually advantageous” transactions where the exploitee, as well as the
exploiter, gains something from the transaction.104 Exploitation may also be
present where a transaction is seemingly consensual—that is, the exploitee
appears to have given voluntary, informed consent.105
At first glance, an exploitation claim by physicians would seem to lack
merit. Physicians, traditionally thought of as societal elites, do not fit the
Marxist image of an exploited worker. Admittedly, physicians receive some
level of reimbursement from MCOs, and maintain some control over patient
care. Their salaries are substantially higher than those of typical blue-collar
workers. However, this does not mean necessarily that they cannot be
exploited. Using Wertheimer’s elements of exploitation, and viewing the case
against managed care in the light most favorable to physicians, it is apparent
that physicians could state a hypothetical exploitation claim against MCOs.
MCOs in many cases do take unfair advantage of physicians. MCOs both
excessively benefit from their transactions with physicians and, most
importantly, MCOs are currently able to turn characteristics of physicians’
situation to their own advantage.
As described above, managed care has had significant effects on
physicians’ working conditions and incomes. As a result, an argument can be
made that MCOs benefit excessively from their transactions with physicians,

100. Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 889, 904
(1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion].
101. ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 207 (1996) [hereinafter WERTHEIMER,
EXPLOITATION].
102. Id. at 209.
103. Id. at 16.
104. Id. at 216. There is disagreement in the philosophical literature on this point. Some
argue that a transaction between A and B can only be exploitative if it is harmful to B. See
Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion, supra note 100, at 897. Others agree with Wertheimer’s
formulation. See ANDREW LEVINE, ARGUING FOR SOCIALISM 66-70 (1988).
105. See id.
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relative to the benefit to physicians. Through utilization review and other costcutting strategies, MCOs are realizing at least some financial gains, due in
large part to decreased reimbursements to physicians and the health plans’ own
increasing market power.106 As noted by Simon and her co-writers: “Under
traditional fee-for-service indemnity policies, most patients have been
insulated from the true price of care because of the prevalence of
comprehensive benefits and low co-payments and deductibles. In contrast,
managed-care plans realize the full amount of any cost savings.”107 This same
study noted that in 1994, specialists in markets that had high levels of managed
care penetration suffered a drop in earnings of nearly eleven percent.108 The
study’s findings “suggest that the spread of managed care is significantly
altering the relative compensation and employment of primary care and
Thus, any benefit to physicians from their
specialist physicians.”109
transactions with MCOs appears slight.
In contrast, the earnings of MCO executives are on the rise. A 1998 report
noted that senior executives of the nation’s largest for-profit MCOs earned an
average of two million dollars per year.110 One recent report found that “on
average, CEO’s for HMO’s and other health care companies receive two-thirds
more compensation than their counterparts in other industries.”111 The same
report noted that salary increases for managed care executives such as chief
marketing officers, chief financial officers, as well as chief executive officers,
were greater than that for practicing physicians. Indeed, employees at all
levels of managed care organizations saw greater pay increases than physicians
during the period 1996-2000.112 It is argued that such high salaries and
generous bonus packages are justified by market principles—it is simply what

106. Managed care’s impact on providers is not limited to physicians. For instance, the
Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”) recently published a report using data
from the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, detailing the significant deterioration in the
financial health of teaching hospitals. The report concluded that this deterioration was linked in
part to “the growth of managed care.” AAMC Fact Sheet, The Financial Health of Teaching
Hospitals Continues to Decline (May 2000), available at http://www.aamc.org/about/progemph/
camcam/factshts/vo14_no3.html. A 1997 study, also by the AAMC, concluded that “medical
schools in regions with high levels of managed care penetration have experienced slower growth
in the size and number of research awards received from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).”
AAMC Fact Sheet, Is Managed Care Affecting the Research Mission of Law Schools (July 21,
1997), available at http://www.aamc.org/about/progemph/camcam/factshts/no12.html.
107. Simon, supra note 31, at 96.
108. Id. at 111.
109. Id. at 116.
110. Aside from the question of whether MCOs exploit physicians, MCO executive
compensation poses significant ethical issues in itself. See KAREN G. GERVAIS & DOROTHY E.
VAWTER, ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN MANAGED CARE 171 (1999).
111. Health Care Executives Most Highly Compensated, MANAGED CARE, May 1999, at 17.
112. Id.
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is necessary to attract the best individuals.113 Yet many who make these
arguments do not apply these same principles to physician compensation.
Perhaps they do not have to. Perhaps it is something besides compensation
that attracts physicians to the practice of medicine. If so, MCOs are able to
exploit physicians by capitalizing on this “something else” and paying them
less than a fair rate of return for their services. Further, given physicians’
training, ethical obligations and potential liability, a legitimate claim can be
made that it is they, and not exclusively MCOs, who should profit from the
provision of health care.
Second, and often most significant for physicians, are the benefits MCOs
reap from having respected physicians as part of their plans, such as attracting
and treating patients. As Larson notes, because of the medical profession’s
“devotion to human welfare,” it has accumulated “a massive capital of social
credit.”114 In effect, MCOs are successfully trading on that social credit and
the trust that the public puts in physicians, and they are using it for their own
gain, whether in the form of profits, market power or reputation.115 Indeed,
MCOs are exploiting physicians by reducing their social credit and are eroding
their professionalism by using them as agents to ration care and not
compensating them for it. This exploitation is even more apparent given that
physicians invest a great deal of time and resources in becoming physicians.
Because of their specialized training and investment in becoming
professionals, they cannot (and in some cases will not) easily leave the
profession.116
Finally, an argument can be made that excessive benefits to MCOs arise
from their use of “take-it-or leave-it” contracts. First, most standard MCO
contracts include provisions which penalize physicians if their utilization of
medical services exceeds a predetermined level, regardless of whether the care
provided was in fact medically necessary.117 Thus, “MCOs have significantly
shifted the financial risk of treating patients to the physicians.”118 Second,
MCO standard form contracts are unfair and excessively benefit MCOs
because they often contain termination-without-cause provisions that “allow
MCOs to deselect physicians at any time if profit-maximizing policies are not

113. GERVAIS & VAWTER, supra note 110, at 176.
114. LARSON, supra note 33, at 39.
115. ROBBINS, supra note 15, at 78.
116. It may be that in the future, the conditions which enable physicians to be exploited may
be mitigated by the fact that students entering the profession will have notice of the conditions
under which they will be expected to perform. For mid-career physicians, however, this is not the
case.
117. John P. Little, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the Doctor-Patient
Relationship and Endangering Patient Care, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397, 1414 (1997).
118. Id.
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followed.”119 The threat of deselection for most physicians is significant,
given MCO’s market power.
Finally, MCO standard form contracts
excessively benefit MCOs because most contain “hold harmless” clauses.120
As the AMA stated: “No reasonable person would, unless compelled, accept a
contract which allows one party to behave in ways that may not meet the
standard of care in tort law, and then shifts liability for that conduct from the
responsible party to the person accepting the contract.”121 At least one
commentator has argued that given these clauses, MCO-physician contracts are
contracts of adhesion, which MCOs are able to use to their advantage. As
such, it has been argued that such contracts are unfair and violate public
policy.122 These features of the MCO-physician relationship supply the
requisite “unfairness” to support a claim of physician exploitation.
Physicians also can show the requisite unfairness to support an exploitation
claim because MCOs are able to turn certain features of physicians’ role in our
health care system to MCOs’ advantage. These characteristics will be
examined below.
B.

The “Free Market” for Health Care is Not Free at All

As seen in the debate over the Health Care Act, one of the features of
physicians’ situation used most skillfully by MCOs, with the full support of the
government, are the “market imperfections” or “market failures” that led to an
explosion of health care costs.123 By pointing a finger at physician salaries and
utilization habits as indicia of inefficiency, MCOs are able to use the “market
metaphor” to exploit physicians. As George Annas argues:
The market metaphor leads us to think about medicine in already familiar
ways: emphasis is placed on efficiency, profit maximization, customer
satisfaction, the ability to pay . . . and competitive models. The ideology of
medicine is displaced by the ideology of the marketplace.124

Yet the “free market” for health care, which the government and MCOs
purport to defend and promote, is not so free at all. The government is a major
market participant, and numerous laws shape the way our health care system
operates. Upon closer examination, it is apparent that the competitive, “free
market” health care system we now have is in many ways a system that works
to protect government and corporate interests.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 1416.
Id. at 1418.
AMA Statement, supra note 9, at 9.
See Little, supra note 117, at 1421.
See generally AMA Statement, supra note 9.
Annas, supra note 96, at 68-69.
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Cass Sunstein, in his book Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech,125
makes a similar argument with respect to the First Amendment. In arguing for
a change in the jurisprudence of free speech, Sunstein proposes a “New Deal”
for speech modeled on the New Deal of the Roosevelt Era. Sunstein states that
before the New Deal period, the Constitution “frequently prohibited the
government from interfering with existing distributions or rights and
entitlements.”126 The prevailing view was that government must be neutral
and take a “laissez-faire” approach, and therefore, respect the existing
distributions.127 New Deal reformers, Sunstein points out, argued that this
“neutrality” was a fiction. Sunstein states that the New Deal reformers’ view
was that “people, rather than nature, had created economic markets and
existing distributions. Laws underlay markets and made them possible. If they
had good reasons for doing so, people might change those markets and existing
distributions.”128 To illustrate the effect that people, and not nature, had on
existing entitlements and distributions, Sunstein states that New Deal
Reformers pointed out that legal rules, such as those involving property and
contracts, had produced certain “entitlements.”129 Sunstein explains:
Those rules specified who owned what and who could do what to whom. All
this was a creation of law. The market system, so often described as the realm
of purely voluntary interactions, was actually pervaded by law . . . what people
had, in markets, was a function of the entitlements that the law conferred on
them. The notion of “laissez-faire” thus stood revealed as a conspicuous
fiction.130

This argument applies with equal force here. The rhetoric of health care
reform is centered mostly on solving the current crisis through enhanced
competition and a “free market” approach. Yet, proponents have not changed
the existing legal framework that shapes our health care system—a framework
that arguably exploits physicians. As Annas argues:
[T]he market metaphor is . . . a myth . . . . The metaphor pretends there is such
a thing as a free market in health insurance plans and that purchasers can and
should be content with their choices . . . the reality is that American markets
are highly regulated [and] major industries enjoy large public subsidies . . . .131

Thus, far from unleashing efficiency-enhancing competition, the managed care
“solution” in many ways has worked simply to further the interests of certain

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1995).
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 125, at 30–31.
Annas, supra note 96, at 69.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

226

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:207

powerful players in the health care system: the government and corporations
which purchase health care coverage.
The government’s involvement in the health care market is not simply
through the laws it makes and enforces—it is a large purchaser of health care
services through the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Spending on health
care has a significant impact on the federal budget. In 1991, 14.3% of the
federal budget went to health care.132 In 1996, Medicare and Medicaid
programs paid between forty-five and fifty percent of personal health
expenditures.133 At least one commentator has noted that “the self-interest of
the public sector may be a real impediment to development of a fair and
efficient supply-side cost sharing policy . . . . Governments do not simply set
the rules of the game in health care, they are big players themselves.” 134
Indeed, the government is not simply a major purchaser of health care; in
many ways, it constructed the system that led to the “market inefficiencies,”
which are frequently cited as justifying lower and lower reimbursements to,
and more controls over, physicians. For instance, the government, at a
minimum, encouraged the current health insurance system where most
employed, insured individuals receive their health insurance through their
employer.135 Because health benefits are not taxable to the employee, the
system provides corporations and their workers with generous tax subsidies.136
This employer-based system is what many believe started the managed care
revolution—employers did not want to continue paying high insurance
premiums for their workers.137 As Rosenblatt notes:
[T]he law provided two types of assistance to the managed care revolution.
First, on the “demand” side of the . . . equation, ERISA . . . permitted
employers to bypass . . . a provider-dominated insurance system in favor of
self-funded plans that avoided provider-dominated fee structures and content
rules . . . . Second, the law aided the transformation to managed care from the
supply side of the equation, as well . . . . U.S. market law favors vertical
integration and the formation of a single large producer of goods and services
[and] . . . the movement toward the formation of large companies selling
discounted health services to unregulated corporate purchasers took off.138

132. JUDITH AREEN, ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 814 (1996).
133. WING, supra note 22, at 88.
134. Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in
Health Care, 7 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 135, 149-50 (1993).
135. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 23, at 225.
136. WING, supra note 22, at 99.
137. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 23, at 227. See also AAHP Statement,
supra note 82, at 76. (“The antitrust laws and antitrust enforcement have played a historic and
special role in the development of managed care as an alternative to fee-for-service medicine for
consumers.”).
138. ROSENBLATT, supra note 16, at 550 (citation omitted).
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In addition, reimbursement levels set by the government for the Medicare
program are often the basis for an MCO’s determination of “reasonable”
fees.139 As one commentator remarked, “while managed care may have its
roots in populism, the model has flowered in the favorable climate created by
the American approach toward deregulation and corporatization.”140
C. Physicians Cannot Openly Advocate for Themselves
A second feature of physicians’ situation, which MCOs use to gain an
unfair advantage, is that physicians are limited in their ability to advocate for
themselves. As explained above, physicians have not advocated for collective
bargaining rights on the basis that they are being exploited. That they are not,
however, is one reason why MCOs and the government are able to exploit
them. At first blush, this statement likely seems ridiculous. It is widely known
that the AMA is a very powerful lobbying organization. Outside of the AMA,
physician specialists have their own lobbying organizations. Yet the physician
unionization debate reveals that physicians are indeed limited in how and how
much they can advocate for themselves by their ethics, by fear of malpractice
liability and by an unsympathetic society.
As a group, physicians take very seriously their ethical commitment to
place patients’ needs first. As Dr. Andrew Yacht recently stated: “[T]he needs
of our patients must always come before our own desires and other
responsibilities . . . . At a time when the needs of patients have become
dangerously obscured by financial considerations, we need to do what we can
to protect those for whom we have sworn to care.”141 As noted above, in
arguing for unionization, physicians cast it as an issue of patient care.142
Indeed, physicians seeking unionization have disavowed, as unethical, one of
the primary tools used by unionized workers—strikes.143 Unlike other workers
attempting to unionize, physicians’ ethics essentially require that they argue for
improved patient care first and their own wages and working conditions second
(if at all). One physician has summed up the frustration physicians feel:
[A]s a group we study more years, work longer hours, bear more crushing
responsibilities, perform greater amounts of free service to our hospitals . . .

139. WING, supra note 22, at 541.
140. ROSENBLATT, supra note 16, at 550.
141. Andrew C. Yacht, M.D., Collective Bargaining is the Right Step, 342 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 429, 431 (2000); see also Jordan J. Cohen, White Coats Should Not Have Union Labels,
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 431, 434 (2000) (“As future stewards of medicine’s core value of service
to others, ask yourselves if affixing the union label to your white coats signals trust in your noble
calling or allegiance to some lesser ideal. Unions are magnificent instruments for extracting
marketplace benefits for their members. But the odds are long indeed that they will be able . . . to
sustain a value system rooted in altruism.”).
142. See generally Yacht, supra note 141.
143. See id.
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than any other group. We must now proclaim our right to demand appropriate
payment for all of this . . . . [I]t is time we abandoned the canard that unselfish
humanitarianism provides our only motivation.144

The fact that many physicians so readily subvert their own interests to that of
their patients makes them prime targets for exploitation at the hands of MCOs.
Second, physicians cannot always take a stand for themselves by openly
doing what is necessary to increase their reimbursements from MCOs, which
would entail limiting care, because of their fiduciary duty to their patients.145
The terms established by MCOs put physicians at financial risk if their patients
utilize more than a pre-determined level of health care services such as
referrals to specialists, emergency rooms or use of diagnostic tests, for
example. If physicians want to increase their incomes, and in some cases keep
their practices solvent, they are required to keep utilization to a minimum—in
effect, to ration care.146 Yet rationing care is not a part of physicians’ ethical
code, nor is it a defense to a malpractice claim.147 Again, MCOs are therefore
able to take unfair advantage of physicians because to some degree, physicians
must provide services to patients, even if they will not get paid for it, to adhere
to their code of ethics and avoid liability.148 Moreover, despite their calls for a
free and competitive health care market, which is traditionally thought to
require providing consumers with reliable and full information, MCOs do not
fully disclose to plan members that rationing is a significant factor in coverage
as well as treatment decisions.149 In effect, MCOs suggest to enrollees that
they will provide a fee-for service level of care, while leaving the physician to
bear much of the risk of delivering it.
Finally, physicians cannot openly advocate for themselves because such
advocacy does not fit our current health care paradigm. We expect physicians

144. Phan, supra note 28, at 116 (citing G. BUDRYS, WHEN DOCTORS JOIN UNIONS 9 (1997)).
145. See Neade v. Portes, 710 N.E.2d 418, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); see also CURRAN, supra
note 38, at 188.
146. The term “rationing” is not very often used in the public discourse on managed care (and
it certainly is not part of MCOs’ marketing strategy). Rationing, however, is clearly what
managed care is about. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed this in Pegram v. Herdrich, 120
S. Ct. 2143, 2150 (2000). The Court stated that “whatever the HMO, there must be rationing and
inducement to ration . . . . [I]nducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO
scheme . . . .” Id.
147. See id. at 2143 (holding a physician allegedly rationing care on behalf of HMO liable for
malpractice). Bedside rationing without full disclosure to the patient may in at least some states
support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. See generally Neade, 710 N.E.2d at 427.
148. See Wickline v. California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see also
American Medical Association Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ethic/ceja (“[T]he physician may not discontinue treatment
of a patient as long as further treatment is medically indicated, without giving the patient
reasonable assistance and sufficient opportunity to make alternative arrangements for care.”).
149. Id.
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to be devoted to our welfare. Attempts to increase their incomes or improve
their working conditions are therefore viewed with suspicion, as the
inappropriate self-interest of wealthy elites. One commentator has stated that,
with respect to managed care legislation, “the drafting of consumer protections
is . . . readily hijacked by entrenched providers, who have their own interests at
heart.”150 In discussing physician deselection, another commentator noted:
Although deselection places physicians at personal risk, lawmakers are more
likely to respond to the risks deselection poses to patients. Unfortunately, this
leaves concerned physicians with a paradox. A promising argument against
deselection requires physicians to take the self-deprecating position that fear
and finance have so upset their fiduciary and ethical duty to their patients that
they can no longer be trusted to provide competent health care.151

Clearly, society is not receptive to pleas that physicians are not paid enough or
have a difficult lifestyle. Indeed, in discussing the Health Care Act, Thomas
Greaney stated:
The rationale for the labor exemption rests primarily on notions of assuring fair
wages and preventing the exploitation of labor by owners of capital. At
bottom then, special treatment of labor is fundamentally premised on concepts
of fairness and redistribution of wealth. With physicians enjoying mean net
incomes exceeding $200,000, income growth significantly higher than other
sectors of the economy, and enormous educational subsidies, the case for
parity of treatment is unconvincing.152

Even assuming that Greaney is correct regarding physicians’ incomes, he is
incorrect in implying that physicians are somehow per se unable to be
exploited. As Wertheimer states, exploitation can be present in mutually
advantageous transactions.153 Moreover, in focusing on physicians’ incomes
alone, Greaney and others do not go behind the numbers to explore the
complex issues of the value of health care in our society, the proper
distribution of income and the proper levels of risk to be borne by those who
provide health care and health insurance. To be sure, physicians are in many
ways different from the traditional blue-collar worker—the vast difference in
incomes being the most obvious. Yet Greaney and others who focus on
physician incomes may be missing the point. Like the traditional exploited
worker, physicians are increasingly disempowered in their workplace.
Moreover, like the classical worker, paid just enough to subsist, we may have
hit or possibly passed the point where physicians can no longer subsist as
professionals given their sizeable investment in training, strict ethical

150. Hyman, Managed Care at the Millennium, supra note 4, at 1063.
151. Liner, supra note 41, at 518 (footnotes omitted).
152. Thomas L. Greaney, Antitrust and the Healthcare Industry: The View from the Three
Branches, 32 J. OF HEALTH & HOSP. L. 391, n.65 (1999).
153. See WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION, supra note 101, at 216.
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obligations and the threat of malpractice liability. Whether we are in fact at
that point, and whether for the greater good we want to stay there, is something
that bears further discussion.
V. CONCLUSION
Our intuition tells us that physicians are elites, and therefore they cannot be
exploited. Relying on this intuition, we adopt policies which attempt to
provide a health care system that gives first-quality care, at the lowest prices,
delivered through a “free-market” system. As the key gatekeepers to health
care, physicians are thus caught in the middle. Top-notch American health
care costs money and for-profit MCOs must watch their bottom line.
Rationing, therefore, is key. The issue is, assuming we have decided that freemarket health care is the solution, how much should physicians have to
sacrifice in the name of the greater capitalist good? This piece recognizes that
physicians have a legitimate claim that in the drive to reform health care
should not be overlooked.

